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FADE IN 
In South Park-style 2-d animation, the heads of Jacques Lacan, Jeremy 
Bentham and Roman Jakobson stand atop sticks before a blank backdrop 
where “p. 12: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis” scrolls vertically, 
horizontally and diagonally without an apparent pattern. 
 
JAKOBSON 
(jovially, putting his arm around Lacan) 
My dear Lacan, may I share with you a key, a little latch, which might 
serve as a hint to your own thinking: Jeremy Bentham’s Theory of 
Fictions. Ordinarily this text seems be neglected in the summary of his 
work traditionally given.  (Jakobson presents the book to Lacan) 
 
LACAN 
(glancing interestedly through the text, looking up periodically to look at 
BENTHAM.  He shuts the book emphatically.) 
 
This personage is far from meriting the discredit, indeed the ridicule, 
which a certain critical philosophy might formulate concerning his role 
in the history of the development of ethics! 
 
BENTHAM 
(who has hitherto stood slightly apart from the group, but now raising 
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his hand to make a fist and an announcement) 
 
In the dialectic of the relationship of language to the real, the Good is 
situated on the side of the real, therefore, I hereby renounce the 
pestilence that is Fiction! 
 
*** 
 
 
[IMAGE: rotating Auto-Icon] This paper is meant to be a “bodying 
forth”—a bringing forward of the body in Jeremy Bentham’s written 
corpus, a body which materialized through the hand his dear friend, Dr. 
Southwood Smith, who, as instructed by Bentham, preserved Bentham’s 
dead body in the manner expressed in the “Annex” to Bentham’s Last Will 
and Testament, entitled “B: Auto-Icon.”  What I would like to do today is to 
cross-read Bentham’s Last Will and Testament, and his last, very eccentric 
essay, “Auto-Icon or, Farther Uses of the Dead to the Living” (1832), with 
Bentham’s Theory of Fictions, the collection of essays spanning Bentham’s 
considerable writing career on this theme compiled by C.K. Ogden in 
1932.1   Intersecting these texts will be several Lacanian texts, with some 
Roman Jakobson in the conversation as well.  These three philosophers of 
linguistic subjectivity meet on page 12 of Jacques Lacan’s Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis Seminar held in 1959-1960 to debate the performativity of 
fiction, the elusivity of the Real, and the subjectivity which comes into 
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Being in the relation between Fiction and the Real.  They all recognize 
what Lacan calls the “fading” of the Subject (aphanisis), that is, a kind of 
deprivation of Being which comes from the Subject subsumed or eclipsed 
by signification, particularly, language.   
 In the Ethics seminar Lacan salutes Bentham as “the man who 
approaches the question [of the progress of knowledge] at the level of the 
signifier” (Ethics, 228). But while Lacan and Jakobson sit very comfortably 
with the construction of the Subject as a function of language, 
epistemologically and otherwise, Bentham clearly rebels against this fading 
of the Subject which he designates, quite disparagingly, the “scourge” that 
is “fiction”.   Arguably, Bentham struggled from the beginning of his 
writing career against the “fiction” inaugurated by the belief in the natural 
law promulgated by Sir William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws 
of England (1765).  Bentham’s first publication, written anonymously in 
1776, the Fragment on Government, mounts an offense against Blackstone for 
the “fiction” that Blackstone endorses in his Commentaries.2  The epigraph 
on the front page of the Fragment, from Montesquieu’s Esprit de Loix, 
announces the starting point of Bentham’s intervention into legal and 
juridical theory: the imperative to de-trump the trick which has been 
perpetrated upon general knowledge itself, in this case, by Judge 
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Blackstone: “Rien ne recule plus le progrès de connaissances, qu’un mauvais 
ouvrage d’un Auteur célèbre: parce qu’avant d’instruire, il faut commencer par 
detromper.”3 (“Nothing can delay the progress of knowledge more than the 
bad work of a famous Author: because before instruction, it is necessary to 
start by undeceiving.” my translation).  Blackstone’s “trick” comprised the 
dissemination of what Bentham elaborates as the detestable fiction 
instituted by the “Original Contract,” also understandable as natural law.   
 As Mary Warnock reads Bentham’s stance, natural law, and the 
Original Contract which sets that law into motion, are the primary causes 
of the “fundamental muddles and incoherences”—of the “‘drug’” or 
“‘opiate’” effect upon citizens -- by which bad or “mischievous” laws, that 
is, laws which are not put to the test of utility and therefore of happiness, 
are put into practice, unchallenged.  For Bentham, natural law was based 
upon an “’indulg[ence]... in the licence of supposing that to be true which is 
not...’”,4 a blind following of laws which, by definition of their being 
“natural,” are interwoven with morals and are, therefore, indisputable.  
The principle of utility, not the hegemony of morals, should determine law, 
Bentham insisted, thus leaving room for the possibility that some laws as 
theorized by Blackstone may not actually be for the greater good. 
(Warnock, 15)  Utility was able to be calculated, determined through a 
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highly structured “felicific calculus,” and would be, as such, a more 
reliable and more “real” foundation than the absolutist dominance of 
morals as the basis of law.  Bentham’s radical new proposal for the basis of 
law would require modification on a massive and material level in order to 
displace the authority of natural law.  And I think it is worth considering 
just that “materiality” of the modification: not only in the level of material 
determinants (in the Marxist sense), but, on the level of the materiality of 
the body, which, notably, is also the metaphorical referent behind 
Utilitarianism’s measurable amounts of “pleasure” and “pain.” 
Bentham’s long battle with the governance of fiction took place on the 
ground of language.  He placed particular emphasis on the legal body or 
person constituted in language: this body-person constituted the 
fundamental unit of the “trumpery” put forth by Blackstone.  Though 
Bentham concedes that Blackstone’s approach to jurisprudence attempted 
to rid the practice of law of its jargon--its “artifice” --, in fact, says Bentham, 
the use of the English language [as opposed to jargon] as the legal medium 
only served to foster “the pestilential breath of Fiction [that] poisons the 
sense of every instrument it comes near.”5  Bentham particularly decries the 
maintenance of the “Fictions of Law”, legal “bodies” constituted solely 
through linguistic positing, upon which the entire foundation of English 
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legal jurisprudence was based.  “Fiction of use to justice?” Bentham 
exclaims in an essay called “Legal Fictions,”—“Exactly as swindling is to 
trade.” (Ogden, 141) Bentham thus characterizes fiction as a swindler, 
looking for the easy mark.  Of course he was up against much more than 
the fiction of law: his became a battle against the discursivity of language in 
general, of which law was paradigmatic.    
Bentham defined “fiction” as the following: “a fictitious entity is an 
object, the existence of which is feigned by the imagination, feigned for the 
purpose of discourse, and which, when so formed, is spoken of as a real 
one.”6  In Bentham’s scenario of fiction, the subject constructed by 
language, which he understands as a “body,” is a fictional sign.  Any 
qualities which are attributed to that subject of language are also 
“altogether fictitious,” because these attributes, he says, are often spoken of 
as if they were “in a body, i.e. a tangible substance, or in some other object 
which is spoken of as if it were a body... which... it is not.”7  Here Bentham 
defines “body” as “a tangible substance.”  But this “tangible substance” 
seems to be prone to an accumulation of fictional overlays.  Even a 
preposition -- Bentham’s example is the word “in”-- will take on and 
enhance the signifying properties which constitute fiction. The preposition 
“in” is yet another sign: the “sign of the relation”. (Ogden, lvii) This 
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accretion of fictional signs within language works metonymically in terms 
of structural linguistics—that is, on a horizontal level that is based on 
syntactic proximity or attachment to other signifiers.  Although the term 
“metonymy” comes from Roman Jakobson’s structuralist model of 
linguistics, and will be elaborated upon by Jacques Lacan, I propose that 
Bentham’s theories of fiction bear remarkable similarities, particularly in 
the mutual acknowledgment of the inevitable accumulation of signification, 
figured as a signifying chain or constellation, which constitutes subjectivity.  
Furthermore, both Bentham and Lacan posit a structural relation of 
proximity or nearness between signification and the “real” that has a 
deleterious effect, especially according to Bentham.   
This deleterious effect is the fading of the Subject theorized by Lacan.  
It is an ambivalent fading, always marked by an indexicality necessary to 
the performativity, a.k.a. the felicity or happiness, of the Subject.   This 
necessary indexicality  comes into play in the linguistic shifter, as analyzed 
by Roman Jakobson.8  Ambivalent in its concurrent conjunction and 
disjunction of the Subject in language, the linguistic shifter is exemplified 
by the primary case of the personal pronoun “I.”  As a signifier, “I” is 
totally general and transferable, and thereby empty [of material “reality”].  
But “I” is also completely singular, “being in existential relation,” that is, 
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being indexically annexed to its individually-existing utterer.  In this 
sense the shifter is a structure of language that is both symbolic and 
indexical, respectively (Jakobson, 388).  Similarly, the fictional body which 
allows law to be performative is in itself devoid of a “real” body, but, in 
reiterative usage by individual users, attaches itself to “real” “material” 
entities or users so that each individual becomes a subject of and 
beneficiary of the given law.  In Lacanian discourse, this indexical joining to 
the otherness or alterity of signification, to the Symbolic, is understood as 
“suture.”  “Suture” effects the proxy subject that is, for Lacan, the Subject.  
This is a subject-persona that “stands in” for the Subject, facilitates its 
“being” through the performative syntax of language, and only through 
such; it is a “deprived” subject, one which has to “give up” the desire for 
discursivity in the Real to submit to discursivity in the Symbolic, named by 
Bentham “Fiction.”    
 But throughout Bentham’s writings, even if he might acknowledge 
the necessity of language, arguably, a persistence of the Real, or at least a 
persistence of the desire for the Real, comes through. This persistence 
manifests in his recurrent recourse to a material, tangible body. Emanuelle 
de Champs’ very interesting and helpful essay entitled “The Place of 
Jeremy Bentham’s theory of Fictions in Eighteenth-century Linguistic 
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Thought,”9 richly contextualizes Bentham’s philosophy of language 
within his own context of 18th century philosophy.  As De Champs relates, 
Bentham, like other philosophers of his time, looked to etymology as the 
proving ground that every word is derived from a sensory-perception, 
comprising a “material image” which beckoned and anchored a “direct 
relation” to the given word. In this sense, explains De Champs, Bentham 
denied any existence of abstract ideas. (De Champs, 11) If this bodily 
phenomenology of language derived from sensory perception is only 
suggestive of “the body” standing in for the material real, Bentham lets us 
know more explicitly that he is calling upon the body as the indicator of the 
“substantial” Real:   
Fate, Destiny, Luck, Lot, Chance, Accident, Heaven, Hell, 
Providence, Prudence, Innocence, Substance, Fiend, Angel, Apostle, 
Saint, Spirit, True, False, Desert, Merit, Fault, Etc. Etc., as well as 
JUST, RIGHT, and WRONG, are all merely Participles poetically 
embodied, and substanciated by those who use them. (my emphasis) 10   
 
 
Thus, as Emmanuel De Champs has noted, Bentham, in line with the 
philosophers of his time, exhibits a certain want for a material referent 
behind language.  Furthermore, his use of the word “embodied” is telling 
here, because he qualifies this word with what Jakobson would call the 
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linguistic “shifter” when adds the phrase, “and substanciated by those 
who use them.”  The body, then, is the indexical signifier in Bentham’s 
mind.  
 So, ultimately what I am trying to do here is to identify “the body” as 
the urgently needed real entity conducive to the realization of the greater 
happiness for the greater number.  This realization of happiness is 
performed by being allowed to occur materially.  Bentham’s explicit 
instructions for the “auto-iconization” of his body in his Will, along with 
his last, unpublished essay “Auto-Icon, or, Farther Uses of the Dead to the 
Living,” comprise the culmination, or at least the attempt to be such, of the 
greater happiness principle.  As useful cadaver, the Auto-Icon in its corpo-
reality, “is” the Real, the Real entity that for Bentham is lamentably lost in 
the Fictional subject of the Law.   The “Auto-Icon” as a body, text, and 
body-text, gives us a special hindsight to Bentham’s Theory of Fiction: it is the 
fulfillment, the “bodying forth”, the propriation, of the legal person, the 
person-in-language.   
 In one of many quirky pronouncements in “Farther Uses of the Dead 
to the Living,” the corporeal body eases the otherwise divisive relationship 
between signifier and signified, trying to eliminate the gap between them 
that leads to abstraction and figuration: “Auto-Icon will soon be 
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understood,” Bentham proposes, “for a man who is his own image... Is 
not identity preferable to similitude?”11  As a performative act, the Auto-
Icon is, as JL Austin, and of course Bentham, would say, “happy.”  The 
high score in the felicific calculus not only comes from the greater good 
being achieved, but, reading on a deeper, perhaps more unconscious level, 
from the continuity between Bentham’s Will, or conscious intention, and 
his corporeal body.  Insisting upon a corporeal voice of intention, Bentham, 
in the annexation of his body to his Will is, in his mind, a model to follow 
for all humankind, beset as humankind is by the deprivation resulting from 
the subject’s constitution in language.  The materiality of the corpse would 
yield a more stable constitution of the living subject than would the 
performativity of language.  Instead of the figurative person of law which 
perform as a proxy subject or place-holder, a corpo-real referent would 
anchor the intentional subject in indisputably tangible reality. 
 However: Bentham’s notion of “ownership” and the proprietary 
nature of one’s relation to one’s image here begins to get slightly tricky, 
because in order for one to physically auto-iconize oneself, one has to do so 
through the transfer of one’s body as property to someone else’s hands (in 
Bentham’s case, Southwood Smith’s).  In “Farther Uses…,” in which 
Bentham prescribes the Auto-Icon to be a head that stands in for the whole 
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body, Bentham constructs a progressive sequence of property markers for 
the Auto-Icon which culminates in its being co-opted into the category of 
the graph:  
As in the progress of time, instruction has been given to make ‘every 
man his own broker,’ or ‘every man his own lawyer’: so now may 
every man be his own statue. Every man his best biographer.’12   
 
The act of auto-iconism is a new kind of writing, and when we read 
Bentham’s Last Will and Testament, where his corpse becomes equivalent 
to his prolific corpus, we cannot help but to begin to read the corpse as a 
text.  The Auto-Icon comprises “an auto-graph of a higher order,” 
specifically, an “auto-thanato-graph.” (“Farther Uses…”, 5, 8)  In “Farther 
Uses…,” Bentham cites as an inspiration the contemporary puppet theater 
in which wooden heads of different characters are laid out “lexonically” on 
a table before an audience. 13  The heads thus become figural, 
transposable.14  Once the line is crossed from “identity” to “graph”, the 
Auto-Icon becomes textual, tropological, figurative, Fictional… 
 Even the body-- perhaps especially the body--is prone to 
appropriation, and Fiction plays on an almost fickle receptivity of “the 
body” to lend itself to the figurality of the graphic mark or linguistic sign.  
Bentham’s allegory of the “automaton” is most telling of this transferability 
of the body into the realm of fiction.  Couched in a footnote of his essay on 
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Movement and Bodies (and included by Ogden in Theories of Fiction)15, the 
automaton allegory becomes especially resonant when read from the 
hindsight of his Auto-Icon.  Both figures are similarly seated, both “in the 
dress of a man... constructed by the ingenuity of the mechanist”:   
Beholding at a distance, in the dress of a man, sitting and 
playing upon an organ, an automaton figure, constructed... by 
the ingenuity of the mechanist, to take this creature of human 
art for a real man, is a sort of mistake which, at a certain 
distance, might happen for a time to be made by the most acute 
observer.  In like manner, beholding a part of speech cast in the 
same mould with the name of a real entity, a really existing 
substance, no wonder if, on a variety of occasions, to the mental 
eye of a very acute observer, this fictitious entity thus accoutred 
should present itself in the character of, and be regarded and 
treated as if it were a real one.  How should it be otherwise, 
when on every occasion on which, and by every person by 
whom it is spoken of at all, it is spoken of as if it were a real 
entity? (Ogden, xlii-xliii) 
 
The automaton put forth by Benthan here brings us full circle back to 
Jacques Lacan, who characterizes the Symbolic, which he aligns with 
Bentham’s Fiction, as “automaton” in his essay “Tuché and Automaton.” 16  In 
this essay, reading the Aristotelian terms, Tuché marks the encounter with 
the Real, and it operates as an always missed encounter which may, or may 
not, “happen” alongside the general discursive Symbolic milieu of 
Automaton. 17    Following Aristotle’s notion of “automaton” being the name 
for animal movement which has no internal cause or intention and moves 
  
 
14 
by outside chance collisions (unlike man, who does maintain internal 
cause), automaton’s appearance of internal cause is key.18   The fact that  
Bentham’s automaton man is sitting at an organ, that is, proximate to 
another instrument, creates the misperception that the automaton is “real.”  
The attribute of mechanical instrument is transferred over to the organ, 
away from the automaton man, who appears to exert control and intention 
upon the organ.  When the automaton man is discovered to be not a man 
but a machine, according to Aristotle, the viewer will look for the cause 
which precedes the automaton.19  The nature of automaton is such that 
mechanical instrumentality seems to constitute an ongoing chain, even as 
you look at it.  Persistent always is the search—unrequited-- for an original 
cause or intention.    
The Lacanian theorist Joan Copjec explains subjectivity as constructed 
by the Lacanian automaton as a primary separation, between the self and an 
almost puppet-like objectivity which ineluctably co-exists with it: “The 
subject constructed by language finds itself detached from a part of itself.  
And it is this primary detachment that renders fruitless all the subject’s 
efforts for a reunion with its complete being.” (Copjec, 52)  Lacan proceeds 
from this fundamental detachment coming from a residence in the network 
of signifiers he calls automaton. He allows for the shifty elusiveness of the 
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real and the chain of signifiers that overtakes and subsumes the real. 
Bentham, on the other hand, reveals a certain resistance to automaton, also 
known as Fiction, condemning it as being a swindling fraud masquerading 
as a real entity but which, contrary to appearance, never actually has any 
indexical relation to the Real at all.  He would like to finally put an end to 
the perpetuation of signification by annexing his corpse to his corpus, his 
preserved head to his Will.  This real, bodily entity might begin to rectify 
the damage incurred by fiction, by the figural body constituted through 
language, a constitution that abandons any anchoring in “tangible 
substance.”  The Auto-Icon is Bentham’s attempt to personify legal fiction, 
by restoring reality as corpo-reality to a body which has been wrapped up 
in layers of fiction and automated by mechanical reiteration.  
But does not the relation of annexation, of the “Auto-Icon” “annex” 
text to Bentham’s last Will and Testament, which then becomes “annexed” 
to the body “itself”, reveal the inexorable metonymy of the signifying 
chain?  Even the corpo-real becomes a graphic mark, immediately annexed 
into the alterity of signification.  Bentham’s logic of auto-thanatography is 
its own infelicitous undoing.  Discussing Bentham’s “proleptic dialogue with 
Lacan,” David Collings writes:  
Death alters the status of one’s intentions, as it does one’s body;  
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to pretend otherwise is to refuse the sway of what Lacan has 
called the Other, the domain precisely of substitutions (such as 
names or symbols), the mode of signification in which any 
subject is necessarily embedded and in whose terms one’s 
identity is framed.  Death marks one boundary of the literal, 
forcing one to recognize that one might signify in a way that one 
did not intend and that any form of representation,  however 
minimal, participates in a logic of substitution that eventually 
dissolves the illusion of the represented’s identity with itself. 
(Collings, 100)  
 
Here Collings, too, is recognizing the conversation taking place between 
Lacan and Bentham across the dissection table of the Auto-Icon.  
Bentham’s consistent recourse to the body and to sense perception 
throughout his voluminous written corpus becomes evocatively apparent 
when read through the body-text of his “own” (dead, real) body, 
bequeathed to the Greater Happiness for the Greater Number.  To be 
opened up further in subsequent reading would be, following Lacan’s lead, 
introducing a program of “ethics” into Bentham’s negotiation of the 
ongoing relationship between Real and Fictional entities. 
*** 
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